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J.M. I<EYNES ON HISTORY AND 
CONVENTION 
John B. Davis 
In 1938, two years after the publication of The General Theory, Keynes read a 
paper to the Memoir Club gathered at Tilton entitled 'My Early Beliefs', in 
which he criticized many of his early philosophical attachments. He con-
fessed that when it came down to disagreements between his friends over 
knowing which states of mind might be thought intrinsically good, it was 
not 'a matter of direct inspection, of direct unanalysable intuition about 
which it was useless and impossible to argue', but '[i]n practice' a matter of 
'who could speak with the greatest appearance of clear, undoubting con-
viction and could best use the accents of infallibility' - G.E. Moore being 
the acknowledged master of the art (C W. X: 437-8). t Keynes's 1938 
critique, however, was not only aimed at the early concept of intuition he 
had inherited from Moore's Principia Ethica. In his early attachment to 
intuition as certain, unfailing direct insight into the nature of what was real, 
Keynes had also gone on to deny that general rules and conventions played 
any significant role in judgement: 'we repudiated entirely customary morals, 
conventions and traditional wisdom' (C W. X: 446). This was hardly in 
keeping with the answer he had recently given in The General Theory, in his 
famous twelfth chapter on long-term expectation, to the question, 'How 
then are these highly significant daily, even hourly, revaluations of existing 
investments carried out in practice?': 'In practice we have tacitly agreed, as a 
rule, to fall back on what is, in truth, a convention' (C TP. VII: 152, 152). 
Here I shall not attempt to account for how Keynes came to abandon his 
early philosophical thinking about intuition and judgement, a task I have 
pursued at length elsewhere (Davis 1994a). Rather, I shall set out Keynes's 
new philosophical thinking about convention as it appears in The General 
Theory, and then attempt to chart the likely post-General Theory path of 
development of the concept of convention in Keynes's thinking. This is 
arguably a task of considerable importance in the interpretation of Keynes's 
later economics, since the genuinely revolutionary positions found in The 
General Theory appear to depend in important respects upon the new views 
Keynes developed there regarding history and conventions. 
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J.B. DAVIS 
The concept of convention is the primary philosophical concept of 
Keynes's later philosophical thinking. Yet because it emerged in Keynes's 
overall thinking tnore as a product of decisions made regarding non-
philosophical matters, in connection "With the probletns of argument 
encountered in the "Writing of The General Theory in the 1930s, the concept 
of convention never received the systematic investigation from Keynes that 
his early philosophical notions had "When philosophy and ethics "Were his 
chief preoccupation. As a result, because the concept has ahvays been seen 
as an economic concept - and then "With an uncertain pedigree - it has gone 
unappreciated as a specifically philosophical contribution of The General 
Theory. The lack of attention the concept of convention received from 
Keynes may also be due to his being influenced by Lud"Wig Wittgenstein's 
thinking about convention. Keynes may have felt that Call1bridge "Was 
already producing a clear philosophical understanding of the nature of 
the concept, and that Wittgenstein was better suited to take on prilllary 
responsibility in that effort. I explore the connections between Keynes and 
Wittgenstein in regard to the concept of convention briefly at the end of 
the discussion below (pp. 218-21). In any event, whatever the relationship 
between Keynes and Wittgenstein, Keynes's failure to take rules and con-
ventions seriously in his early philosophy left hilll "Without a clear account 
of the nature and "Workings of convention "When he turned to the topic in 
The General Theory and "Was chiefly concerned "With econolllic argulllent. In a 
second edition of the book he might have chosen to alllplify those passages 
"Where the operation of conventions "Was central to his argulllent. But what 
"Was ultilllately tnost needed was a careful elaboration of the central ideas he 
believed were involved in the concept. On account of his early death and 
the tremendous detnands upon his tillle of policy and economic debate in 
his last years, this elaboration never occurred. Accordingly, it is necessary to 
reconstruct how Keynes's argument and thinking about convention lllight 
have proceeded in light of the foundations laid down for the concept in The 
General Theory. 
I undertake this project in a nUlllber of steps. First, turning to the 
passages of The General Theory where convention is central, I lllap out the 
structure of the concept there, lllaking very brief reference to the changes 
in Keynes's philosophical thinking that were afoot subsequent to his 
earlier exchange in the 1920s "With Frank Ralllsey on the llleaning of 
probability. Second, I discuss ho"W Keynes's treatlllent of the concept of 
convention was opaque yet also susceptible of SOllle clarification. The topic 
here lends itself to the idea of a second edition of The General Theory. In such 
a work it "Would surely have been Keynes's intention to preserve the 
essential integrity of the original "Work so as to maintain the power of its 
conclusions. Though the concept of convention is very central to Keynes's 
later econolllic thinking, most readers "Would no doubt have seen further 
discussion of the concept as a distracting digression. As has long been 
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appreciated, the basic ideas of the book "Were too revolutionary to be easily 
absorbed, and thus it "Would not pay to complicate an argument "Which many 
already found difficult.2 Third, I proceed to further possible developments 
in the concept of convention that Keynes might have undertaken in a more 
peaceful later life. "My Early Beliefs' signals Keynes's intention to set the 
record straight about his early philosophical thinking, but it goes little 
beyond this. Moreover, Keynes's post-General Theory "Writings do not add 
significantly to our understanding of Keynes's thinking on the subject. 
Thus, ITly strategy in this section of the chapter is to examine the short-
comings of Keynes's General Theory vie"W of convention together "With 
indications of the likely direction of his thinking to construct a case for 
the development of his later thinking on the subject. Finally, in the last 
section of the chapter, the influence of Wittgenstein and the confluence of 
Keynes's and Wittgenstein's thinking on convention are investigated In an 
effort to isolate key philosophical issues involved in the concept. 
THE STRUCTURE OF KEYNES'S GENERAL THEORY 
CONCEPT OF CONVENTION 
To understand the role the concept of convention plays in Keynes's think-
ing"We need to understand ho"W Keynes believed that less than full employ-
ITlent equilibria "Were possible in the economy. This in turn is perhaps best 
understood in the context of the principal misinterpretation of Keynes's 
thinking in the years afler the publication of T"he General Theory. Economists 
trained in 'What Keynes had called classical thinking, yet 'Who label them-
selves Keynesians (or neoclassical Keynesians), generally agree that equili-
brium unemployment is only possible "When there are frictions or 
imperfections in the economy. This mistaken interpretation of Keynes's 
vie"Ws centres most often upon the labour market (but also the bond 
market) "Where it is typically said that "Workers may suffer money illusion, 
or an inability to distinguish real and money-"Wages. Ho'Wever, in the 1980s 
this vie"W 'Was found unpersuasive by many economists 'When rational-
expectations theorists argued that rational agents 'Would not make systema-
tic expectational errors. Without systematic errors in expectation, it "Was 
then argued, equilibrium unemployment simply could not occur, and 
Keynes's equilibrium unemployment vie'W (or "What it had been taken to 
be by neoclassical Keynesians) 'Was said to be based upon a misunder-
standing of the process of expectation formation. 
Overlooked in this history of reception "Was the fact that Keynes himself 
had never employed the idea of money illusion or indeed argued that 
econoITlic agents, rational or otherv.rise, made systematic expectational 
errors.
3 Indeed, in Keynes's vie'W, if "Workers 'Were 'Willing to reduce their 
ITloney-"Wage demands in pursuit of employment, 'Worker incomes might 
"Well fall sufficiently that firms 'Would "Withdra"W employment in the face of 
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falling sales. In such circumstances, the economy was, as it were, locked 
into a low-level circuit of wage payments and consumption expenditures 
that still left a portion of the workforce unemployed. An additional source 
of demand was consequently needed if full employment were to be 
achieved; and among the questions that preoccupied Keynes during the 
time he was working through the drafts of The General Theory in the 1930s 
were: why investment expenditure could not be counted on to provide the 
additional demand a full employment economy required, and how this 
investment insufficiency related to the character of investment as a form 
of conventional activity. In important respects, then, Keynes's understand-
ing of unemployment equilibria depended upon his thinking about con-
ventions. Accordingly, we need to be able to explain how conventions 
functioned, and how they determined levels of activity among individuals 
making investment decisions, to be able to explain unemployment equilibria 
for Keynes. This in turn suggests that, because conventional behaviour is 
by nature an interactive sort of activity, we need to begin by looking at how 
Keynes understood behaviour generally. 
Before turning to what Keynes had to say in The General Theory about the 
behaviour of economic agents in a general sense, it will be helpful to review 
briefly his well-known exchange with Ramsey over Keynes's understanding 
of intuition in his 1921 A Treatise on Probability. At issue is Keynes's theory of 
judgement, an important cOll1ponent of a theory of decision-making and 
action, and a topic which received serious attention in the Treatise on 
Probabiliry. In his early philosophy Keynes had applied the theory of intui-
tion, developed first by Moore and then by Bertrand Russell at the 
beginning of the century, to the analysis of probability judgements. In 
Keynes's view he believed hill1self to be extending Moore's and Russell's 
philosophical revolution against the philosophical idealisll1 of EH. Bradley, 
Bernard Bosanquet and J.E.M. McTaggart. But Keynes's view was also 
original in departing from the then widely accepted frequency theory of 
probability, which ll1ade probability judgements out to be empirical state-
ll1ents about the relative frequencies of events. Keynes argued first in his 
early unpublished Apostle paper, ·On Ethics in Relation to Conduct' (1904) 
and later in the Treatise on Probability that the frequency theory presupposed 
general rules whose application itself presupposed acts of judgement. This 
seemed to give a special place to direct, unmediated intuitive judgetnent, or 
intuition, and Keynes went on to conclude that probability judgements were 
ultimately founded upon our intuiting abstract but real probability relations. 
Ramsey, however, was altogether sceptical of both the idea of intuiting 
metaphysical relationships and of the notion that individuals possessed a 
capacity for insight into the nature of the reaL He concluded that 
a fundamental criticisll1 of Keynes's views, is the obvious one that there 
really do not seem to be any such things as the probability relations he 
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describes. He supposes that, at any rate in certain cases, they can be 
perceived; but speaking for rnyself I feel confident that this is not true. 
I do not perceive thern, and . . . m.oreover I shreVTdly suspect that 
others do not perceive thern either ... 
(Ram.sey 1978: 63) 
When Keynes finally carne to reply after Rarnsey's death, he sim.ply agreed: 
'I think he is right' (C W. X: 338-9).4 This does not im.ply, it should be 
ernphasized, that Keynes overthreVT the VThole of his early reasoning in the 
Treatise on Probability about the forrns assurned by probability judgernents. 
As argued by Jochen Runde (1994b, 1994c), Keynes alrnost certainly 
retained his general cornparative probability conception that emphasized 
ordinal comparisons, VThile discarding the Platonic relations metaphysics 
rneant to explain the meaning of probability, VThich Ramsey had found an 
easy target. 
The significance of this for Keynes's later economics and thinking about 
convention is that abandonrnent of a role for intuition in the Platonic sense 
changed the conceptual foundations of Keynes's philosophical thinking 
about decision-making and action. Since the judgernent involved in agent 
decision-making could not be explained in terrns of an unrnediated intuitive 
apprehension of timeless qualities and relations, it necessarily possessed a 
historical character. Judgernent exercised by individuals in economic life 
reflected their being historical individuals reasoning in terms of concrete 
circumstances created by past patterns of events. Practically speaking, this 
rneant that VTe looked to individuals' dispositions, tendencies and propen-
sities to explain their behaviour. The social econornic VTorld exhibited a 
variety of forces and causes operating upon individuals, and VTe could at 
best sort out individuals' tendencies to respond to these forces and causes. 
Keynes ""as clear about this in his summary of his rnodel, in Chapter 18 of 
the Genera! Theory, <The General Theory of Ernployment Re-stated'. We 
begin, he asserts, by identifying the factors that are given, the independent 
variables, and the dependent variables, ""here chief among the 'ultimate 
independent variables' are <the three fundarnental psychological factors, 
narnely, the psychological propensity to consume, the psychological attitude 
to liquidity and the psychological expectation of future yield from capital 
assets' (C W. VII: 246-7). These variables of course reflect levels or states 
of activity associated -v.rith demand in different spheres of the economy. 
Thus to understand aggregate dernand ""e needed to understand the dis-
positional character of human behaviour as a set of tendencies to respond 
to the cornplex historical forces impinging upon individuals. 
In The General Theory, then, Keynes turned a""ay from the more episodic 
conception of judgernent and behaviour that he had adhered to in his early 
philosophical intuitionism. In its place, he dre"" upon another tradition in 
philosophy at Cambridge that regarded econornics as a rnoral science. 
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Writing to Roy Harrod in 1938 in a letter critical of Lionel Robbins's natural 
science conception of economics, Keynes stressed the need to understand 
the complex character of human motivation to explain the distinctively 
social behaviour studied in economics: 
I . . . want to emphasise strongly the point about economics being a 
moral science. I mentioned before that it deals "With introspection and 
"With values. I might have added that it deals with motives, expectations, 
psychological uncertainties. One has to be constantly on guard against 
treating the material as constant and homogeneous. 
(C W. XIV: 300) 
Contrary to Robbins's view that a few simple principles were involved in 
economic behaviour, decision-rnaking in economic life was a complex affair 
with many factors entering into individual judgement. The deterrninacy 
natural science seeks in its conclusions is unavailable in economics, which 
as a moral science cornbines analysis of human motivation with an account 
of the historical circumstances in "Which individuals find themselves. Thus, 
there is no simple account of human judgernent available to us, as Keynes 
had once thought possible in regarding judgement as intuition. Historical 
individuals' intuitions, in fact, "Were 'intuitive' in the ordinary sense of the 
term: rather unpredictable responses to cornplex circurnstances resulting 
from a variety of competing rnotives. 
From this perspective, we can see why Keynes dre"W back frorn his early 
confidence in the powers of individual judgement, and charged hirnself and 
his early friends at the 1938 Mernoir Club rneeting "With rnistakenly thinking 
they could 'judge every individual case on its merits, and ["With] the "Wisdorn, 
experience and self-control to do so successfully' (C W. X: 446). That view, 
Keynes confessed, had been based upon 'an a priori view of "What hurnan 
nature is like, both other people's and our own, which was disastrously 
mistaken', when the conclusion which experience taught was that the 
'hurnan race' did not sirnply consist of 'reliable, rational, decent people, 
influenced by truth and objective standards, "Who can safely be released 
from the outward restraints of convention and traditional standards and 
inflexible rules of conduct' (C W. X: 447). Indeed, it was best to assurne, 
Keynes emphasized, that 'civilization "Was a thin precarious crust erected by 
the personality and will of a very few, and only maintained by rules and 
conventions skilfully put across and guilefully preserved' (ibid.). Rules and 
conventions, that is, anchored individual behaviour, whether in ethics, 
politics or economic life, and we thus only grasped the behaviour of 
individuals fully "When "We understood how it carne to be subsumed under 
society's rules and conventions. 
Econornic behaviour, in this respect, "Was thus in important ways inter-
active. Keynes had indicated as much in his letter to Harrod when he had 
emphasized that economics rnade use of introspection and judgements of 
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value. That is, just as economists might analyse the behaviour of indivi-
duals using introspection and judgements of value, so individuals in the 
economic 'world also used these methods to evaluate each other's responses 
to complex conditions that faced alL Since, contra Robbins, economic 
behaviour "Was neither constant nor homogeneous, individuals typically 
lacked clear strategies of response to the circumstances in which they 
found themselves. One -way of addressing this -would be to examine the 
behaviour of other individuals in like circumstances. By observing another's 
actions and through introspection and judgements of value imputing a 
motive to that individual for those actions, we could reinforce or revise 
our o-wn opinions regarding desirable courses of action in similar circum-
stances. I have argued at length else-where (Davis 1994a) that this form of 
interaction implies a conception of individual judgement that is best termed 
interdependent judgement, and that, as a historical, concrete mode of 
judgement replacing Keynes's earlier vie-w of judgement as abstract intui-
tion, it operates in Keynes's various analyses of convention. Perhaps the 
most vivid example of this is Keynes's metaphorical representation of 
professional investment as a ne-wspaper beauty contest. 
Recall that the question Keynes raised regarding placements -was: 'Ho-w 
are these highly significant daily, even hourly, revaluations of existing 
investments carried out in practice?' (C W. VII: 151). Keynes's ans-wer, 
that this process of revaluation depends upon a convention that <the 
existing state of affairs -will continue indefinitely, except in so far as -we 
have specific reasons to expect a change' (ibid.: 152), only invites us to 
-wonder -when there are indeed reasons to expect a change; or, as Keynes 
puts it, ho-w precarious the convention regarding any given set of invest-
ments might be. Not very reassuringly, Keynes goes on to assert that a 
'conventional valuation ... is established as the outcome of the mass 
psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals' (ibid.: 154), or: 
professional investment may be likened to those ne-wspaper competi-
tions in -which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces 
from a hundred photographs, the prize being a-warded to the compet-
itor -whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences 
of the competitors as a -whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not 
those faces -which he himself finds prettiest, but those -which he thinks 
likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of -whom are 
looking at the problem from the same point of vie-w. 
(c. W. VII: 156) 
The idea that it is not the prettiest but those most likely to be thought the 
prettiest nicely captures the change in Keynes's vie-w of judgement. No 
longer does the individual intuit the real quality of beauty, but rather 
proceeds to dra-w a judgement interdependently about -what others facing 
the same dilemma may choose. Each contestant, in effect, uses introspection 
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to consider his or her own opinion, compares that to an opinion imputed to 
others, ITlakes adjustments for judgements of value, and COITles up with an 
individual judgeITlent bearing the strong imprint of social opinion. Place-
ITlent, which at any time involves considerable speculation, is in Keynes's 
view little different. Individual investors cannot know through intuition the 
true value of an investment, and thus rely upon their abilities to gauge the 
mass psychology of the public and especially the temper of other investors. 
The convention governing investment, therefore, may be defined as a 
temporarily settled state of opinion that derives from a ITlass of interde-
pendent judgements made by different individuals. 5 
This, of course, does not tell us ITluch more about the precariousness of 
the convention governing investment. Indeed, if anything, I<eynes's char-
acterization of convention only raises ITlore questions about the dividing 
line between the stability and instability of investment expenditure, since 
the business of imputing motives to others (though we regularly do it) is 
clearly fraught with considerable difficulty. Here, however, we begin to see 
the state of development and status of Keynes's philosophical thinking 
about the concept of convention. What Keynes was clear about on the 
concept was that a convention is a structure of interdependent judgements 
across individuals that both contributes to the determination of different 
individuals' respective judgements and results from the interaction of 
different individuals making their respective judgements. In the other 
locations in The General Theory v.rhere the concept has a role, this viev.r 
can well be seen at work. Admittedly, in no instance is as much attention 
given to the notion as in Chapter 12 on long-term expectations, though 
there are interesting things said, some explicit and some more implicit, 
about bonds and the rate of interest (C.IP. VII: 202-4), about relative 
money-v.rages and v.rage bargaining (ibid.: 264 ff.), about producer price 
expectations (ibid.: 46-51), and about what Keynes calls the subjective 
factors influencing consumption (ibid.: 107-12). 
Unfortunately, in the secondary literature on the interpretation of Keynes 
there is some confusion about what the concept of convention concerns. 
Some writers have been quick to link conventional behaviour and irrational 
behaviour, often thinking in the latter instance of Keynes's reference to 
<animal spirits' (C.W VII: 161). George Shackle (1967, 1974) did much to 
encourage this son"letimes popular viev.r, which has n"lore recently been 
defended by Ted Winslow (1986) in connection with Keynes's interest in 
Freud. Three points are in order. First, while for Keynes conventional 
behaviour sOlnetill"les sin"lply involves individuals unrcflectivcly observing 
conventions as rules of thumb, it ITlore often involves their operating within 
patterns of activity that contribute to the structuring of their behaviour. 
Second, Keynes clearly believes ll"luch decision-making is what is generally 
terll"led rational (e.g. in connection with his chapter on the ll"larginal effi-
ciency of capital). Third, Keynes also treats the existence of irrational 
210 
KEYNES ON HISTORY AND CONVENTION 
behaviour separately from his treatment of conventional behaviour in both 
<My Early Beliefs', v.rhere conventions actually control irrational impulses, 
and in Chapter 12 of The General Theory, v.rhere conventional behaviour is a 
(second-)best response to the dilemma of determining a good investment 
in an uncertain v.rorld. This latter point has been emphasized by a number 
of recent contributors to the topic of Keynes and convention. Anna 
Carabelli (1988: 224) argues that conventional behaviour for Keynes 
involves <practical techniques . . . for facing the future in a situation of 
limited knowledge'. R.M. O'Donnell (1989: 251) sees investment conven-
tions as a form of weak rationality. Tony Lav.rson (1985b, 1993) treats 
conventional behaviour as a rational strategy, and adds that conventions 
are an important form of social knowledge. Of course, much turns in this 
on the meaning of 'rational'. If <rational' is taken in the Platonistic sense of 
intuiting essential relations and qualities (as in O'Donnell), the term seems 
mistaken and inappropriate. But if <rational' is equated with reasonable 
judgement in the sense of being a cognitive process of deliberation set in 
a historical context and influenced by individual values and motives (as in 
Carabelli and Lawson), then it seems that conventional behaviour can v.rell 
be thought 'rational'. 
The position here is that because conventional behaviour is an interactive 
activity, it needs to be understood on its own terms, apart from the issue of 
v.rhether behaviour is rational or irrational. Some authors have emphasized 
views of this sort. Oliver Favereau (1988) makes interactive behaviour and 
conventions central to his interpretation of Keynes's probability thinking in 
tenns of possible-v.rorlds reasoning. Similarly, Bruce Littleboy (1990: 29) 
argues that <one of Keynes's most important innovations lay in the realiza-
tion of the significance of conventions that arise v.rhen transactors, con-
fronted by an uncertain environment, are psychologically disposed to act in 
a manner in which they study and imitate the actions of others' .6 A. Orlean 
(1989) advances a formal analysis of imitative interaction between profes-
sional speculators to account for a number of ideas in Keynes's Chapter 12 
discussion of professional investors. Of course, imitative interaction is only 
one (relatively simple) form of conventional behaviour, and to argue that 
individual decisions tend to converge in an imitative process requires strong 
assumptions about the patterns of interaction between individuals that 
Keynes did not alv.rays make himself. Indeed, though Keynes was much 
concerned with conventions as a basis for explaining behaviour in ways that 
went beyond simple aggregation of individual behaviours, he did not go 
very far in The General Theory tov.rards explaining the various different v.rays 
in v.rhich conventions operated and changed. 
What, then, v.ras Keynes not clear about in The General Theory in his 
treatment of convention? Aside from not developing the distinctions 
between different kinds of conventions, Keynes does not tell us much 
about the stability or instability of conventions, whether those that govern 
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investrnent or other domains of the economy, and thus his account of the 
dynamics of conventions rernains to be developed. We do find in connec-
tion "With his discussion of investrnent in Chapter 12 a treatrnent of the 
issue of investor confidence, a rnatter Keynes had puzzled over from the 
time of his writing A Treatise on Monry. Thus it seerns fair to suggest that 
"Were Keynes to have produced a second edition of The General Theory he 
"Would have at least atternpted to say rnore about ho"W confidence affects 
the stability or instability of the convention governing investment. This 
extension might in turn serve as a rnodel for how the dynarnics of other 
conventions operating in money markets, labour markets and else"Where 
rnight begin to be explained. With this conclusion, "We thus turn to changes 
Keynes rnight have pursued in a <second edition' of The General Theory. 
CONVENTION IN A ~SECOND EDITION~ OF THE 
GENERAL THEORY 
To see how Keynes might have re-tailored his exposition in his twelfth 
chapter on long-terrn expectations to allo"W more illurnination to fall on the 
topic of confidence, it is necessary to look more closely at how he under-
stood the convention governing investment as a structure of interdepen-
dent judgernents. For Keynes, conventions helped to deterrnine the levels 
or states of activity taken on by the psychological propensities and attitudes 
at work in the econorny. But strictly speaking, since these psychological 
propensities and attitudes rnanifest thernselves in varying degrees in dif-
ferent individuals, it is more accurate to say that conventions act to 
structure different individuals' propensities and attitudes in relation to 
one another. This becomes clearer if "We think of a convention as a structure 
of interdependent expectations (expectation being a forrn of judgement), 
and note Keynes's special emphasis upon average expectation in his treat-
ment of the convention governing investrnent. What constitutes a good or 
bad investment, Keynes tells us, is <governed by the average expectation of 
those "Who deal on the Stock Exchange as revealed by the price of shares' 
(Co W. VII: 151), where average expectation, from the perspective of the 
beauty contest metaphor, is deterrnined according to <"What average opinion 
expects average opinion to be' (ibid.: 156). 
An average expectation of an investment's "Worth, ho"Wever, rnust sub-
sume a set of different individual expectations, since different individuals 
have different views regarding a given investment's "Worth. Different indi-
viduals rnight thus be said for Keynes to position thernselves in investrnent 
markets relative to average opinions in those rnarkets. In doing so, they 
compare average expectation and their o"Wn individual expectations regard-
ing various investments, considering the "Weight they feel they should 
ascribe to overall market opinion as embodied in average expectation 
relative to the weight they feel they "Want to ascribe to their o"Wn individual 
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opllllons and expectations. Each dimension of expectation has its o'-Vn 
plausibility, and yet each also lacks certain advantages that the other 
possesses. Average expectation reflects the judgement of many investors, 
and thus carries a certain guarantee against individual errors in judgement. 
Yet it is not a guide to making gains in the market since that requires 
anticipating the movement or the market ('to out'-Vit the cro'-Vd'; C. W. VII: 
155). Individual expectations, in contrast, often reflect special knoW'ledge or 
opinion relevant to a given investment Cby reason partly of differences in 
environment and ... partly of differences in knoW'ledge and interpretation 
of the situation'; ibid.: 198-9), and thus at least hope of gain. But, of 
course, trying to beat the market also carries the possibility of loss. Inves-
tors, Keynes noted, are alW'ays intent on 'foreseeing changes in the con-
ventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public' (ibid.: 
154). Thus individual and average expectation both figure in investor 
behaviour, and '-Ve may suppose that central to the stability of an invest-
ment market and the convention governing it is '-Vhatever balance is 
achieved bet'-Veen individual and average expectation, W'here average expec-
tation is continually likely to be changed by individual profit-seeking? 
Keynes approached this question of balance or precariousness in terms of 
the concept of confidence. There are three cases to distinguish to under-
stand the role he gave to confidence. First. apart from the question of the 
dynamics or movement in a given investment market, a conventional valua-
tion might be stable if fluctuations in price around an average value tended 
to leave price '-Vithin a certain range. In this instance, confidence W'ould tend 
to manifest itself in a conviction on the part of individual investors that 
average expectation W'as likely to prevail and individual vie'-Vs about an 
investment's value added little to average opinion. Second, in investment 
markets W'here price moved significantly but then fluctuated around a neW' 
average value, confidence '-Vould manifest itself differently during the price 
movement and aftel"W'ard: initially confidence '-Vould appear as a conviction 
on the part of investors that some individuals ('-Vith one vie'-V of the 
investment's price movement) had expectations superior to average opinion 
(causing average expectation to continually shift); later, '-Vhen price carne to 
fluctuate in a given range, confidence W'ould appear as a conviction that 
average opinion '-Vas again a better guide to price. The third case is the one 
that often concerned Keynes most, namely, that situation '-Vhere instability 
seemed to rule in a given market valuation, and '-Vhere the market seemed 
likely to move '-Vithout a clear destination. In this case, confidence is gen-
erally undermined, and fails even to be manifest in investor conviction that 
an orderly movement in the market driven by superior individual expecta-
tions is afoot. Of course, Keynes kneW' that markets cannot be driven by 
'bear' or 'bull' expectations indefinitely. But he W'as unable to say W'hy a 
market '-Vould ultimately re-settle into some ne'-V range of values, or '-Vhy 
confidence re-emerged after a period of turmoil in opinion. 
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What W"e can thus say about Keynes's thinking about confidence is that it 
turned on a balance betW"een individual and average expectation. What does 
this imply? From a psychological perspective, confidence is an affective 
state of mind in W"hich an individual brings closure to a cognitive process of 
investigation by regarding any conclusions reached as adequate and satis-
factorily final. Lack of confidence is reflected in indecision regarding the 
boundaries appropriate to a thought process, and an inability to complete a 
course of judgement. It W"ould not be reasonable, it seems, to expect 
Keynes to have developed a psychological analysis of individual reasoning, 
so as to be able to say hoW" individuals actually became confident about one 
thing or another. What, hoW"ever, it seems it W"as appropriate for Keynes to 
have done in his attention to confidence in The General Theory W"as to set out 
an account of the conditions associated W"ith states of confidence obtaining 
across individuals in various markets. That is, W"hat W"ere the circumstances 
that in his vieW" alloW"ed confidence to emerge? In this respect, he W"ould 
have built on his account of conventions as a form of interactive activity 
W"here an interdependence of individual judgements explained levels of 
activity of his independent variables. This, at the same time, W"ould probably 
have gone beyond the modest sorts of changes a 'second edition' of The 
General Theory W"ould have permitted. 
In a 'second edition' of The General Theory, then, Keynes might have 
proceeded by draW"ing more attention to the role of confidence in deter-
mining particular patterns of conventional judgement. To the extent that 
this can be understood as a question of individual confidence, Keynes did 
indeed emphasize the fragility of individual expectation in his reference to 
conventional judgement in a subsequent paper. In his response to his critics 
in his 1937 QuarterlY Journal if Economics paper he dreW" attention to this 
theme: 
KnoW"ing that our oW"n individual judgment is W"orthless, W"e endeavour 
to fall back on the judgment of the rest of the W"orld W"hich is perhaps 
better informed. That is, W"e endeavour to conform W"ith the behaviour 
of the majority or the average. The psychology of a society of indivi-
duals each of W"hom is endeavouring to copy the others leads to W"hat 
W"e may strictly term a conventional judgment. 
(C W. XIV: 114) 
Moreover, as many commentators have noted, Keynes also took this 
occasion to emphasize the radical uncertainty associated W"ith decisions 
facing the future, a circumstance that could be expected to heighten the 
sense of indecision and the fragility of the state of confidence in an 
investment community. But if these points W"ere made more strongly in a 
re-issue of The General Theory they W"ould not have taken the reader much 
further toW"ards an understanding of W"hat might settle states of confidence. 
And, since Keynes advanced an equilibrium theory of unemployment, he 
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needed this further elelllent in his analysis, if conventions v.rere to be seen 
as central to the explanation of the econollly. Thus ""e turn in the follo""ing 
section to ho"" Keynes's argulllent lllight have been further developed 
beyond the frallle""ork of The General Theory. 
BEYOND THE GENERAL THEORY 
That Keynes's basic understanding of a convention depends upon vie""ing 
individual judgelllent as interdependent, v.rhere the illlputing of lllotives to 
others involves conjecture and speculation, suggests that confidence is 
central to the very process of judgelllent itself. Indeed, ""hen individuals 
introspectively exallline their o""n lllotives and cOlllpare thelll to those they 
think are justifiably illlputed to others, unless they possess SOllle llleasure of 
confidence about their thinking, they seelll as likely to doubt their conclu-
sions as think thelll reasonable. Every individual of course is a relatively 
autonolllOUS being in the sense of possessing a private thought process. Yet 
v.re custolllarily do lllake confident claillls about v.rhat ""e suppose others to 
feel and think. Ho"", then, can individuals be confident that they correctly 
illlpute lllotives and beliefs to others v.rhose thoughts and feelings are, as it 
v.rere, hidden frolll vie",,? Traditionally there are nvo general ansv.rers to this 
question, one of v.rhich figures prolllinently in Keynes's thinking. First, 
through po""ers of inference ""e read individuals' lllotives frolll their 
observed actions and behaviour. Confidence in illlputing lllotives to others 
in this instance depends upon making reference to v.ridely accepted patterns 
of connection benveen action and lllotive. Second, ""e also consult ""ith one 
another, and then adjust our opinions accordingly. Keynes v.rould have cited 
both of these explanations, but had special grounds for noting the latter. In 
his characterization of the pursuit of average opinion in connection v.rith the 
beauty contest llletaphor, he elllphasized the illlplicit, successive iterations 
involved in individuals trying to anticipate ho"" others lllight anticipate 
(ho"" others tnight anticipate, etc.) ""hat average opinion v.rould be: 
It is not a case of choosing those v.rhich, to the best of one's judgtnent, 
are really the prettiest, or even those v.rhich average opinion genuinely 
thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree ""here ""e devote 
our intelligences to anticipating ""hat average opinion expects the 
average opinion to be. And there are SOllle, I believe, v.rho practise 
the fourth, fifth and higher degrees. 
(c: W. VII: 156) 
Yet hov.r lllany iterations such a process lllight involve is less the point here 
than noting v.rhat is involved in the very possibility of there being higher 
iterations. That is, to the extent that an individual is able to illlagine higher 
degrees of anticipation, then that individual is able to illlplicitly confirlll 
lo""er degrees of anticipation in others.8 Confidence elllerges, consequently, 
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if not quite by consultation, then by an interaction between individuals 
commonly involved in attempting to establish each other's motives on a 
common subject, where that interaction leads to successive degrees of 
anticipation. On Keynes's view, therefore, because individuals engage in 
interdependent judgement of often considerable complexity, they are able 
to establish some confidence about one another's motives. 
But to fully understand interdependence between individuals, it needs to 
be remembered and emphasized that the process of imputing rnotives to 
others is a many-sided one engaged in by many different individuals sirnul-
taneously. When Keynes speaks about the practices of the Stock Exchange, 
he is not thinking only of his own case as one investor, but rather of rnany 
like individuals interacting with one another on roughly the same basis. Thus 
the iterative process of anticipating others' views is being carried out by 
rnany individuals whose respective success in imagining higher iterations of 
anticipation not only confirrns each individual's separate opinions about 
others, but also tends to confirrn the entire collection of individuals in their 
conjectures about investor rnotives in the market. Put sirnply, confidence 
for Keynes is shared confidence. In effect, because judgernent is interde-
pendent in the manner described, confidence emerges between individuals. 
This means that if we are to extend Keynes's thinking about conventions in 
The General Theory we tnust delineate the different conditions under which 
shared confidence develops. For Keynes, the issue truly concerns states of 
confidence obtaining between groups of individuals. 
Recall, then, that our discussion of the precariousness or stability of 
investtnent - the topic where the state of confidence is at issue for Keynes 
- distinguished three cases according to the way in which confidence 
develops or declines. In the first case, the market was relatively settled 
and average expectation was dotninant. Here shared confidence coalesces 
in a widespread conviction that individual expectations are quite sirnilar, 
and that individual motives vary little. In the second case, where price 
changes but then re-settles into a new range, there is initially a pattern of re-
evaluation of investor rnotives carried out by each individual in the tnarket, 
at least until the direction of price change and likely full tnovetnent 
becornes clear. Confidence in this case is shared at bes t by srnalier collec-
tions of investors who agree on the nature of the change in the rnarket 
(such as <bulls' or 'bears'). Individual expectations are, however, obscure 
across groups, and individuals lack confidence about their own opinions 
rnore generally. The third case involves an unstable rnarket that rnay 
fluctuate wildly or appear to be tnoving in one direction without sign of 
re-settling. It tnight be thought that such a situation exhibits high levels of 
confidence if tnany individuals ultitnately agree on the direction of the 
tnarket (as in a crash). But it could also be argued that what confidence 
individuals possess about each other's views is not deep in the sense of 
involving higher degrees of anticipation, and that little confidence really 
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exists ben.veen groups or individuals regarding v.,here the market is ulti-
mately headed. Individual expectations. then. are not especially coherent. 
confidence is fragile. and the convention that things -...vill remain the same 
indefinitely is. as Keynes "\.Varned. precarious. 
For Keynes. then. the conditions associated "\.Vith states of confidence 
concern the success or lack of success -...vith "\.Vhich individuals corne to 
assess each other's opinions about markets. Ho"\.Vever. given the complexity 
of a process of interdependent judgement. "\.Vhere the subjects involved and 
associated motives may be diverse and vary continuously over short periods 
of time. explaining the conditions underlying different states of confidence 
may be quite difficult. It "\.Vould certainly be a mistake to suppose, then, that 
Keynes hoped or thought individuals' different judgements in any market 
-...vould ultimately converge. or that the distribution of individual expecta-
tions about an average "\.Vould in the long run be small. <Bulls' and <bears' or 
other...vise constituted divisions in opinions "\.Vere desirable and inescapable 
dimensions of an economy built upon individual decision-making and 
action. Keynes. none the less. "\.Vould still have liked to see less instability 
in placement markets, since this seemed to depress investment expenditure 
and consequently levels of aggregate demand. Thus as a long-term policy 
proposal. Keynes recommended Ca some"\.Vhat comprehensive socialisation 
of investment' (C W. VII: 378). "\.Vhereby public and semi-public boards and 
agencies such as universities, port authorities. redevelopment corporations. 
and so on. "\.Vould direct a larger share of total investment expenditure. This 
institutionalization of investment "\.Vould in his vie-...v create conditions for 
better communication and understanding among individuals "\.Vithin orga-
nizations having shared purposes. and. on the grounds that like minds 
"\.Vould conceivably exhibit higher states of confidence. lead to more stable 
investment rates in part of the economy. The investment community at 
large. Keynes believed. "\.Vas simply too atomistic to avoid the regular s"\.Vings 
in confidence that lent the convention surrounding investment its periodic 
instability. and accordingly a long-term policy sensitive to the conditions of 
confidence "\.Vas in order. 
The concept of shared confidence, then. "\.Vould have required ne-...v texts 
and another venue subsequent to any re-issue of The General Theory to be 
adequately developed. Much of "\.Vhat the notion involves "\.Vas implicit in 
Keynes's treatment of convention as a structure of interdependent judge-
ment, and much of "\.Vhat is involved in the idea of creating a stronger climate 
of confidence -...vas explicit in Keynes's "\.Vritings for many years both before 
and after The General Theory. Indeed. Keynes's o"\.Vn personal confidence that 
there -...vere al"\.Vays steps that could be taken to reduce unemployment demon-
strates the importance he placed on the idea that the conditions of confidence 
"\.Vere central to the operation of the economy. Of course. Keynes may not 
ever have chosen to direct his energies to"\.Vards this more social philosophical 
aspect of his thinking. The direction of his intellectual development for many 
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years had been away from. philosophical argum.ent, and it is difficult to 
im.agine an individual so involved in practical affairs taking tim.e away from. 
his m.any com.m.itm.ents to elaborate upon such concerns. It would have 
required, no doubt, a very peaceful and extended retirem.ent. 
KEYNES AND WITTGENSTEIN 
It m.ay none the less be possible to speculate about Keynes's later philo-
sophical thinking regarding convention by considering ideas he m.ay have 
shared with Wittgenstein. It is well known that Keynes and Wittgenstein 
knew each other at Cam.bridge, and it seem.s that they were also acquainted 
with each other's work (Coates 1990). Indeed, their intellectual histories 
followed certain com.m.on paths. Both m.ade significant contributions to the 
early twentieth-century Cam.bridge philosophy initiated by Moore and 
Russell - Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Keynes in 
his A Treatise 0/ Probability - and both later abandoned m.any of their early 
ideas in revolutions in thinking that fundam.entally influenced philosophy 
and econom.ics respectively. Moreover, Wittgenstein joined Ram.sey in 
criticizing Keynes's probability relation,9 and Keynes indicates that he 
had opinions about Wittgenstein's later philosophy in correspondence. 
What is there, then, in Wittgenstein's later thinking that has links to Keynes's 
later philosophical thinking? 
One im.portant dim.ension of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is its 
abandonm.ent of the view held in the earlier Tractatus that language is ulti-
m.ately com.posed of nam.es, the m.eanings ofwhich are sim.ple objects. In the 
Investigations Wittgenstein substituted the view that the m.eaning of an expres-
sion is its use, as reflected, as he put it, in the language gam.e in which that 
expression is used. Keynes had held a view sim.ilar to the m.eanings-as-nam.es 
view in his own early work where he used Moore's notion of there being an 
indefinable sim.ple quality of goodness that we know intuitively in accounting 
for the m.eaning of the term. <good' (see Davis 1994a: ch. 1). And, like 
Wittgenstein, he later cam.e to em.phasize (in <My Early Beliefs,) the im.por-
tance of social rules and conventions such as would be involved in a language 
gam.e in Wittgenstein's sense to account for what m.ight be thought to be 
good. Each, then, reasoned that social practices, each having a relative 
autonom.y, played an im.portant role in determ.ining the m.eanings of the 
objects and activities of the world. For Wittgenstein this also m.eant that 
one could not typically produce a rationale for the rules a language game or 
practice exhibited. One rather grasped their function and purpose by, as it 
were, playing the language game or participating in the practice. Much the 
sam.e opinion enters into Keynes's discussion of convention in The General 
Theory. The convention governing investm.ent m.ay be said to have rules in the 
interaction am.ong individual investors, but these implicit rules only have 
m.eaning within the framework of that conventional behaviour. 
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It tnight be thought, however, that Wittgenstein's thinking about lan-
guage games really concerns matters essentially little related to what pre-
occupied Keynes in his attention to convention in The General Theory. 
Keynes wanted to account for patterns of interaction between individuals 
in different domains of the economy, in order to explain aggregate demand 
and unemployment equilibria. Wittgenstein was interested in re-explaining 
language meaning as part of a more general project of redeveloping our 
theory of mind and conception of philosophy as an intellectual enterprise. 
Yet Keynes's conception of the operation of a convention actually shares 
more of Wittgenstein's project about language games than it initially 
appears. The determination of an investment's value in the form of a 
community of investors' average expectation constitutes a meaning of sorts 
for the activity of making that investITlent for individual investors.While 
market values are not ITleanings in the ordinary sense of language meanings, 
they none the less bear sense interpretable by individuals who are part of 
the practice in which they are defined. Indeed, Wittgenstein's abandonment 
of the idea that meanings are names itself encourages a new view of what 
sorts of entities meanings are. The traditional view of meanings as linguistic 
items that bear relations to various features of the world is replaced by the 
view that meaning is a product of a social practice. Thus, on this broader 
view, an investment value is a ITleaning not in the sense of a number that 
simply compares a flow of possible earnings and capital goods purchase 
costs, but rather in the sense that those earnings and costs reflect a social 
practice eITlbedded in certain historical opportunities, investor sentiITlents 
and patterns of market development. 
FrOITl this perspective, Keynes's view that average expectation emerges 
from the play of individual expectation, where an inherited or reigning 
average value represents a point of departure for individual investors, can 
be seen to bear interesting connections to Wittgenstein's concept of <family 
resemblance'. Wittgenstein's idea was that in every case where things are 
called by the same name there is not a single quality or set of qualities 
common to all these things, but rather 'a complicated network of simila-
rities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes over-all siITlilarities, some-
times siITlilarities in detail' that he terITled <family resemblances' 
(Wittgenstein 1953: 32e). On this view, a name does not represent quite 
the same thing to all individuals, though generally individuals who under-
stand a name somewhat differently can appreciate each other's usages 
through participating in language games where the naITle is employed. 
Keynes's treatment of a convention involves essentially the saITle under-
standing. Individual expectations regarding investments are typically dis-
tinguished from average expectations, the analogue of a comITlon name. 
Yet individual investors, though they may doubt one another's invest-
ment strategies, can still appreciate that each is, as it were, playing the 
same game. Thus just as the meaning of naITles is established for 
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Wittgenstcin in a practice that distributes features of that tneaning across a 
variety of gatnes or usages, none of which possess all those features, so for 
Keynes the tneaning of an investtnent is distributed across a variety of 
individual expectations each of which reflects sotne insight into an invest-
tnent's worth, but none of which fully captures that range of insights. 
One further cotnparison between Keynes and Wittgenstein seetns in 
order. Wittgenstein is well known for his argutnent that there cannot be 
a private language in the sense of a set of tneanings that individuals tnight 
allocate apart frotn interaction with others through acquaintance with inner 
streall1S of consciousness. More broadly, Wittgenstein believed that descrip-
tions of our tnental acts and states of mind were governed by criteria that 
made reference to the circull1stances, behaviour and dispositions of indi-
viduals. Keynes, we saw above, approached individuals' behaviour disposi-
tionally, and then in his 1l10ral science rell1arks ll1ade this a ll1atter of 
individuals' <ll1otives, expectations, and psychological uncertainties' (C W. 
XIV: 300). But it is ill1portant here to understand Keynes's view of the 
linkage between psychology and behaviour. When individuals consider the 
motivations of others in order to understand their actions, they introspec-
tively establish what motives they themselves would have were they to 
pursue similar actions, because they wish to have SOll1e basis for explaining 
other individuals' observed behaviour in terll1S of possible motives. Thus if 
an individual were to satisfy him or herself that another individual had 
some motive where a certain action was observed, an understanding of the 
circull1stances, behaviour and dispositions of individuals - observable 
behaviour generally - would be the key to cOll1paring individuals' unobser-
vable motives. Keynes, then, seems to share a conception of psychology 
and behaviour similar to the one Wittgenstein employed. Indeed, since 
Keynes had held in his A Treatise on Probability that one could be directly 
acquainted with one's inner sensations (all1ong other things), but gave up 
this view with his abandonll1ent of intuition as a source of direct insight 
into the world, it seems that a case could also be ll1ade for saying that 
Keynes would have agreed with Wittgenstein that private languages were 
not possible. 
Of course, the points outlined here about the philosophical connections 
between Keynes and Wittgenstein are speculative, and would require more 
careful discussion to ll1ake either a case for their having shared views or the 
particular interpretation suggested here of Keynes's later ideas (cf. Davis 
1996). But it is not unreasonable to attell1pt such an argument, since not 
only were Keynes and Wittgenstein aware of the way each other's work had 
developed from a nUll1ber of COITlmon beginnings, but both shared a 
cliITlate of intellectual development at Cambridge in the 1930s that must 
have reinforced ITlany of the views they each developed separately. Cer-
tainly this latter developtnent, that of the intellectual climate in which they 
operated, is sometitnes neglected in intellectual histories which chart each 
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individuars path in isolation frofn the larger sodal and intellectual world 
and the connections between the different disdpHnes. Further thinking 
about Keynes's later philosophy, which received little elaboration by Keynes 
in hjs later years) 'would seem to require greater attention to this wider 
sphere of intellectual development. 
NOTES 
1 Keynes added that this 'was hardly a state of mind which a g(own~up person in 
his senses could sustain lit.erally' (p. 422). All references to Keynes's works are by 
volume number to the Collected Writings 0/ John Mqynard Kryne.r. 
2 One good measure of the difficulty of interpreting Keynes's argument is the 
difficulty of detennining the standing of IS-I~{ analysis in Keynes's thinking. 
See Young (1987) for a valuable account of the early problems of interpreting 
The GClJcral Theory. 
3 That Keynes did not assume rigid money-wages is clearly apparent in Chapters 2 
and 19 of The General Theory. 
4 See Cottrell (1993) for a good discllssion of this impottant exchange. 
S For an influential, recent philosophical account of convention emphasizing 
interdependent judgement that is very close to the analysis here, see Lewis 
(1969). For a discussion about the proper concept of convention to attribute to 
Keynes, see Runde (1994c). 
6 Littleboy goes on to advance for Keynes a theory of macroeconomic dynaIllics 
based on the interaction of different conventions in different spheres of the 
economy (Little boy 1990: 289f£'). 
7 Keynes'S discussion of 'bears' and <bulls' in money markets is particularly 
appropriate: <[t]he market price [that is, average e.xpectation in the language of 
Chapter 12] 'Will be fixed at the point at which the sales of the «bears" and the 
purchases of the "buUs" are balanced' (C U-:::: VII: 170). 
8 Lev.ris (1969) is especiaUy clear on the iterative nature of anticipation in a 
convention. 
9 In his 1935 Lent 'Term Lectures, \XTittgenstein was tecorded by Alice Ambrose 
as saying:: 'Keynes claimed to discover a probability relation which was like 
implication. But logic is a calculus. not a natural science, and in it one can make 
inventions but not discoveries' (Ambrose 1979: 138-9). Wittgenstein later 
credited Ram.sey and Sr.l.ffa, another. friend of Keynes, in the preface to his 
Philosophical.lnvestigations with being the chief influences on the, dcvelopIllcnt of 
the ide,as in that influential book. 
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